Dabao-kuo and the Winning of Mindanao

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Abstract

This paper argues that the early Japanese presence in Davao had enormous impact on the "winning of Mindanao" as a defining politics in the construction of the Philippine state. Under the American colonial administration (1900-1935), Japanese settlers started coming to Davao, on southern Mindanao as early as 1903. Thousands more followed later to open up lands to grow abaca, then a major Philippine export next to sugar. By the 1930s, some 25,000 Japanese inhabited that region. Their visible presence gave birth to the monicker, *Dabao-kou*, meaning "Little Tokyo." Regarded as menacing, the Japanese "colonization" of Davao stirred Filipino nationalism that, in turn, helped shape Philippine territory and hastened the birth of a modern state. During the Commonwealth era, Mindanao became a highly contentious issue in Philippine politics. President Manuel L. Quezon found the Japanese, together with the Moros (Muslims), as convenient scapegoats to rationalize the plan to claim Mindanao as integral to the Philippine territory. Mindanao represents one of the country's three stars symbolized in its flag. Thus, Quezon authorized deployment to this frontier thousands of Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas until 1940. Indentured migration resumed more vigorously after World War II, reaching its peak in the 1960s. Consequently, this

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government project hemmed in the Japanese settlers in Davao, according to the plan. At the same time, it also diluted the Moro population in Mindanao who lived in the adjacent provinces of Cotabato and Lanao. As the politics of Mindanao waxed and waned, the "third star" symbolic of this southern region perfected the Philippine territory. While the Philippines succeeded in resolving the "Japanese menace" it was saddled by issues that would continue to hound the nation today.

Keywords: abaca, Dabao-kuo, Christian settlers, Moro, Japanese

Introduction

At the turn of the 20th century, overseas Japanese community was found concentrated in two Philippine sites: Baguio, in northern Luzon, and Davao, on the island of Mindanao. This paper is concerned with the latter. It will describe the significant Japanese presence in that area and analyze its implications to the emerging political system in the Philippines during the 1930s that helped shape its geography as a modern state.

The large concentration of Japanese in Davao gave rise to the monicker *Dabao-kuo,* as the Japanese colonists in the Philippines called Davao. This name is reminiscent of *Manchu-kuo,* the state established by Japanese colonists and military in northeastern China during 1931-1945 (Hayase, 1999; Quiazon, 1958). In the Philippines, *Dabao-kuo* is equivalent to "Little Tokyo" or "Japantown" among the locals.

Unlike *Manchu-kuo, Dabao-kuo* did not experience the use of force to "colonize" the area. The community of Japanese settlers (or colonists) accounted for only about 6% of the total population of Davao in 1939, but dominated its commerce and trade during this period and earlier. Davao then became the largest producer of abaca that surpassed the Bicol region. Abaca was the country's second major export to the global market next to sugar, later it rose to number one.

The significance of *Dabao-kuo* in Philippine history was that it helped raise Filipino nationalism, for bad or worse, which

in turn configured the Philippines as the first democratic state in Southeast Asia during the 20th century. How that happened is what this paper is about.

Japanese Diaspora

The Japanese in the Philippines is part of the larger process of population movement from Japan called diaspora.[1] Large swath of Japanese immigrants and their descendants are found in various countries today, especially in Hawaii and Latin America (Brazil, Peru), and have become among their assimilated citizens. In Asia, not much is known about the Japanese diaspora. Its presence in Mindanao was "an obscure chapter in Japan's pre-WWII history" (Dresner, 2007, http://www.froginawell.net/japan/2007/06/japanese-diaspora-at-aspac). However, during the Spanish colonial administration some 3,000 Japanese workers resided at its peak in Manila in the 1620s (Wray, http://eh.net/XIIICongress/cd/papers/10Wray383.pdf).

In Davao, the Japanese presence in Davao started to be felt in 1903, when 23 Japanese pioneers came to try their luck in this inhospitable region dominated by "wild" tribes and "warlike" Moros (Muslims in Mindanao). This was followed by about 180 a year later, and in 1905 more came to Davao when the Kennon Road project in Baguio was terminated. This project relied mostly on Japanese laborers and artisans. Thus began a Japanese exodus until the outbreak of World War II. In the years preceding it, an annual average of 2,000 Japanese settlers tried their luck in this frontier, and at the peak their number reached over 25,000 at one time.

The Japanese population in Davao stood pat on its resolve to make a living, even under the harshest condition of the time. On record, the Japanese planters were said to have constructed over 300 kilometers of road, most of it being used by the public for free, in contrast with the local government's accomplishment

of having put up only 100 kilometers of road. They also built a hospital.

The Japanese community, though small compared to the total population of Davao, paid at least half of all local and insular taxes.[ii] During 1931, of the ships entering the port of Davao, 12 were American, 16 were British, one was Dutch, one was Norwegian, and 65 were Japanese (cited in Goodman, 1967:21). Further, according to a report in 1932 Japanese interests controlled all of Davao's timber production, 80% of its hemp production and 50% of its copra production.[iii] In 1936, they occupied a total area of 60,116 hectares of land, which is more than half of the total area of Bataan province and 17 times that of Manila (*Manila Bulletin*, May 15, 1936, Box 29-9, Hayden Papers,). Davao's land was placed at about one million hectares most of it was jungle. Thus, the image of Davao's development is painted as one of rising prosperity and growth.

From Presence to "Menace"

Not long after, the positive presence of *Dabao-kuo* would assume an entirely different gaze. It was also ironically painted as "Japanese menace" since the Japanese were then considered a security risk to the islands, and understandably to the nation. Two such parallel events contributed to this negative image. First was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931-32. It became known as *Manchu-kuo* to the Japanese, whose occupation continued until 1945 when the Russians invaded it and handed it back to the Chinese government. The second development was the impending grant of independence to the Philippines by the United States, while Filipino agitation intensified as formal hearings in the US Congress began in earnest in the wake of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill of 1932.[iv] Davao, or the whole island of Mindanao, was rich in natural resources and therefore summoned vital importance for the national development agenda. This region was increasingly seen as being penetrated by an alien group whose interest was inimical to the state still in the works.

After a visit to Davao in June 1932, US Governor-General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. must have set the tone of this Japanese scare when he wrote a lengthy confidential letter to General LeJ. Parker on the Japanese issue. As the highest American official and representative of the President of the United States in the Philippines, his words carried weight. He saw the Japanese making advances in every aspect of their endeavors, because

> ...their organization is compact and sound at every stage, their leadership able, their technical advisory aid the best obtainable and, if they dominate the commerce and agriculture of the Davao area, as assuredly they do, it is not because of numbers, for they are outnumbered twelve to one, but because of sheer demonstrated efficiency." (BIA 6144/171-1/2. Letter of Roosevelt to Parker, Oct. 12, 1932)

Moreover, Gov. Roosevelt, Jr. also foresaw one great disadvantage behind their conspicuous presence. In his strongly worded message in that same letter, he said:

> The situation in Davao presents a potential menace to the security of the Islands. That the Japanese are firmly entrenched there, that they are extending their influence, that they dominate the hemp and lumber business in that region, there is no shadow of doubt. That they are planning future expansion with further extension of their control over hemp, coconut, timber and cattle is probable. And finally, that in the event of the withdrawal of American sovereignty there will be an immediate and positive advance along all lines there is likewise little doubt. The weakness, richness, and proximity of the Islands present altogether too lucrative a stake for Japan to ignore, and should American protection be withdrawn, then Japanese economic exploitation and political penetration will at once become a very real threat. (Roosevelt to Parker, 1932, BIA 6144/171-1/2)

Pedro Blanco[v] summed up his apprehension in this manner:

> Our only quarrel with the Japanese people is that we do not wish our country to become the receptacle of Japanese immigration and the field of Japanese enterprise. We know too well what is happening in Korea and in Formosa, in Manchuria and in Mongolia. We wish to preserve the Philippine Islands for the inheritance of our people for generations to come, even unto posterity. How to attain this end most effectively, is for the Filipino people to decide. Will it be with the help of Japan or that of America; among the latter, we already have many friends (Blanco, 1933:15).

Like Roosevelt, US Vice-Governor General Joseph Hayden also believed that "...the Japanese will continue their drive in the Philippines and ... it is doubtful whether in the long run, American trade in the islands, especially that in cotton piece goods and other articles that can be manufactured much more cheaply in Japan than in the US, can permanently withstand Japanese competition" ("Japanese Interests in the Philippine Islands," 1935, Box 28-4, Hayden Papers).

Allegations of illegal landholdings by the Japanese, unrestricted immigration to Davao, and connivance with local officials prompted the Philippine Legislature to create a Special Committee on September 12, 1932 to investigate the matter. The committee's report noted four significant facts about the Japanese in Davao: (1) the lack of restriction on Japanese immigration to the Philippines and the direct route from Japan to Davao had contributed to a rising tide of Japanese immigration there; (2) the Japanese population had reached 15,000; (3) many Filipinos in Davao had leased the maximum 1,024 hectares of land from the government and subleased them to the Japanese; and (4) the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in reaction to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria allowed Japanese retail trade to flourish (Goodman, 1967:25).

The hottest issue during the 1930s was the acquisition or use of land by the Japanese. While there was a law prohibiting acquisition of land by corporations wholly owned by foreigners, the Japanese did manage to improve their holdings by other means, such as by "marriage" with the native Bagobos, and by directly providing capital in the name of Filipino planters,[vi] among others. Some of these methods turned out to be dubious, such as the use of *pakyaw* system. This system was described as follows:

> The *pakyaw* contract provided that the Japanese was to be employed to clear the land, to plant abaca at his own expense, and, when the abaca was two years old, to be paid one peso for every "hill" of abaca planted by him. If the landholder failed to pay the one peso per hill and such failure was standard procedure, the contract further provided that the Japanese was to retain possession of the land from ten to fifteen years, during which time he would continue to clear the land, cultivate abaca, strip the fiber, and receive from 85 to 90% of the profits, the rest going to the Filipino landholder. Moreover, the Japanese cultivator was to bear all the expenses of land development and improvement and even pay the taxes (Goodman, 1967:5).

Through this system, the Japanese planters were able to acquire landholdings far beyond that which was legally allowed. Finally, the *pakyaw* system was considered illegal in 1935, thereby putting a stop to subsequent leases (Goodman, 1967: 53). Even so, some native Bagobos who acted as lessors complained of the cancellation and brought the matter to authorities in Manila.

One such investigation on alleged "illegality of Japanese landholding" and the larger problem it brought to bear was conducted by Eulogio Rodriguez, who served as Secretary to Governor-General Frank Murphy. However, some Filipino officials favorably disposed to the Japanese countered the accusation. Even Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon was

quoted by the press as saying that "there is no Japanese problem in Davao" (Horn, 1941:272). In truth, he was just being "diplomatic" and avoided open confrontation with Japan. He assured the Japanese Consul that he would "study the matter" and "give full consideration to the acquired rights and interests of the Japanese," while respecting the position of the United States on the Davao question (Goodman, 1967:57).

Confronting the Menace

The Japanese "menace," although not publicly acknowledged as such to avoid hurting Japanese sensibility and diplomacy, nonetheless became an issue that drew government attention and sapped its energy. Many Filipino and American officials were concerned about it, but at the same time argued that the fault could be in the laxity of the law or non-implementation of the same, if not government ineptitude and corruption in the service.

Taken in this light, the government policy deployed a subtle strategy calculated to reduce the impact of this perceived "Japanization" of Davao. One such strategy was to allow increasing control of the southern island by Filipino settlers, encouraged no less by the ensuing "Filipinization" of Philippine bureaucracy and the Jones Act of 1916.

Both American officials and Filipino nationalists view the Davao question as a grave concern for an independent Philippines. The common perception was that an independent Philippines was an answer to Japan's prayer. Pedro Guevara, Philippine Resident Commissioner to Washington for many years, was quoted to have said: "Only a blind man can fail to see that Japan desires to dominate the Philippines, with their undeveloped resources and strategic location. First will come Japanese economic investments," he said, "then immigration, finally political rule" (cited in Anderson, 1939:266). Once independent, the country could not possibly count on the United States for help in case of an external attack. The US was unlikely to come to the succor of the Filipinos since it could not

be held accountable for something it had no responsibility. Unassisted, the Philippines could not possibly defend itself.

In 1939, the Japanese threat was called to public notice again by American Congressman John Alexander, who proposed to the US Congress to investigate Japanese-Philippine relations. In that resolution he charged that "certain Philippine public officials have leased large sections of land in Davao ...certain officials of the Philippine government have been bribed by Japanese persons and companies, and President Quezon has repeatedly appointed to high public office Japanese-minded persons" (Goodman, 1967:87. Although the resolution was vetoed, Congressman Alexander would later rationalize this argument: "It was my theory, based on the need for Japanese industrial expansion and their action in Manchuria and China, and their penetration of the East Indies and the Philippines, that they were about ready to make an attempt to grab the entire area" (Goodman, 1967:88).

Quezon did not let this thing pass. He retorted that "the question of the Japanese colony in Davao took place under the American administration," and that "the situation created in Davao has been created not only under the American flag but by American administrators." In a speech delivered in Davao, he said:

> Now, my countrymen, I am not going to pay more attention to that nonsensical and absurd speech of Congressman Alexander. I am going to tell you that we are facing a practical question in Davao. Many of these plantations are admittedly legal. Some of these plantations, it is alleged, have not been acquired legally by them. If it were true that some of these plantations have been acquired illegally by the Japanese, it is the fault of the Filipinos in Davao who allowed themselves to be used by the Japanese (Quezon Papers, June 28, 1939).

These statements have been corroborated by other speeches of Quezon, the most telling of which is his remark, again quoted by the press, "denying that there existed a Japanese question in Davao." No less than former Governor General of the Philippines Francis Burton Harrison, and later Quezon's adviser during the Commonwealth era, revealed this in his diary written in 1936: "He (Quezon) said 'there is no Davao question,' and that the press had been guilty of irritating public opinion both in Japan and the Philippines." Harrison further said, describing Quezon: "that there is nothing in Davao which threatens Filipino rights nor the economic position of the country." Talking to Quezon now, Harrison insisted that "if there is no Davao question there is a Davao situation, which is not to be sneezed at" (Harrison, 1951:104). Quezon was nonetheless fully aware of the issue, but that he was cautious about offending the Japanese sensibility and in portraying to other nations a Filipino bad sense of justice in dealing with foreign nationals. On January 13, 1936: "The President (Quezon) stated "...that the Japanese question resolved itself into a dilemma—either to avoid showing them that the Filipinos were antagonistic to the Japanese, or else let them occupy the islands industrially" (Harrison, 1951:41).

Amid his tip-toeing attitude over the Japanese issue, Quezon must have also realized the adverse consequences, if Mindanao were taken over by other nations, and if he would not develop it for Filipinos. He thus "tried to push the development of Mindanao by laying a five-year plan for road building" as a determined effort to "open up the south as part of the rights of the human race to land and to existence."[vii] These rights he considered even "superior to the rights of nationalism, according to Harrison (1951:44). On June 6, 1936, Quezon spoke to the Philippine Assembly:

> He addressed the Assemblymen, asking for funds for the development of Mindanao. He used maps, and said that an electric railway was to be built from Misamis via Bukidnon to Davao, the water power for this project coming from the falls in Lanao. Only four

> or five of the Assemblymen had ever been to Mindanao before. The gathering seemed to be willing to vote the money, but wanted to know how they were to get the colonists. Quezon replied 'Open roads, and they will come of themselves.' (Harrison, 1951:44)

The "Japanese Menace" in Tandem with "Moro Problem"

Meanwhile in Mindanao, another ethnically related issue loomed large -the "Moro problem" - in which the Muslim people were regarded as causing headaches to American colonial administration. They constituted the majority in the areas declared as domain of the military governed Moro Province (1903-1913) consisting of the undivided districts of Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, Zamboanga and Sulu. The intention of the Americans was to integrate the Moros with the Filipinos in a self-government that was forthcoming and spelled out in the Jones Act. Najeeb Saleeby, superintendent of public schools in the Moro Province, defined the nature of this problem thus:

> By the Moro problem is meant that method or form of administration by which the Moros and other non-Christians who are living among them, can be governed to their best interest and welfare in the most peaceful way possible, and can at the same time be provided with appropriate measures for their gradual advancement in culture and civilization, so that in the course of a reasonable time they can be admitted into the general government of the Philippine islands as qualified members of a republican national organization. (BIA 5075-60, 1913)

The "Japanese menace," in tandem with the "Moro problem," no doubt made a great impact on the position of the Commonwealth government toward Mindanao. Early on, the government began in earnest to lay down a land scheme in Mindanao meant to "hem in the Japanese expansionism" without officially declaring "war" on the Japanese (Haydeen, 1942:721).

Among these policies is Commonwealth Act No. 4197, passed by the legislature on February 12, 1935, in which the government appropriated P1 million for the establishment of elaborately planned agricultural colonies designed to improve upon the earlier programs of the American colonial regime. Although this did not amount much to hold back the growing Japanese industry, it did create a pattern that would stimulate larger projects. Its success is that it set in motion large-scale resettlement programs that the Philippine government pursueed with more vigor.

For his part, Quezon contemplated other plans beside road building and resettlement. During a visit to the area on June 30, 1936: "Quezon said of Davao that he intended to persuade ten rich families from Negros, Bulacan and Pangasinan to take up a thousand hectares each, and establish modern hemp haciendas there to show the Filipinos that they can cultivate better than the Japanese," as Harrison (1951:104) carefully noted in his diary. It was not clear whether this plan pushed through. Quezon believed that the Japanese holdings of some 15,000 hectares were relatively small compared to Davao's total land area, but their future expansion could be held in check by "waiting for the expiration of their leases and then by refusing to renew them" (Harrison, 1951:141). This is Quezon's wit that did not go public, but was silently expressed in his decisions about how he actually handled Mindanao.

Four years later, on June 3, 1939 the government passed Commonwealth Act No. 441 creating the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) and appropriated P20 million for its operations. This ambitious program of development would facilitate the settlement and cultivation of unoccupied lands in Mindanao for thousands of Filipino land seekers.[viii] Besides its stated legal purpose, it was clearly meant to limit the possibility of the Japanese colony extending to nearby areas outside Davao. Reading the fine print of this project, however, reveals that the settlement is also aimed at conquering the Moro country for the sake of national interest.

At the helm of the administration of NLSA was General Paulino Santos, former Director of Prisons and one time Chief of

Staff of the Philippine Army. It was believed that the NLSA gave preference to Filipino young army reservists over other applicants for settlement in Mindanao to distribute these "young men with military training in strategic locations in order to neutralize the Japanese in Davao, many of whom were reported to be Japanese Army or Navy reservists" (Goodman, 1967: 115). The project identified three strategic areas and subsequently opened them for settlement: the Compostela-Monkayo valley at the northeastern part of Davao, the Kidapawan plains, and the Koronadal valley, both at the west and southwestern side. These settlements would "confine the Japanese" to where they were located, thereby preventing their possible expansion in the future (Hayden, 1942:721). At the same time, the Kidapawan and Koronadal settlements are at the heart of the Moro-dominated settlements that slowly but surely changed in demographic character as oceans of homesteaders from Luzon and the Visayas were brought in.

General Santos, whose name is now imprinted on a city that grew out of the settlement, was serious in shipping in more settlers in these areas. He was fully aware of the national significance of developing Mindanao to effectively ward off the Japanese and Moro fears, based on Vice-Governor Hayden's advice:

> The whole history of rich and undeveloped areas is that they ultimately become the possession of whatever people populate and use them. If you can put a million Filipino settlers into Mindanao in the next ten years, you will make that island forever yours. (Hayden letter to Paulino Santos, June 28, 1939. Box 29-13, Hayden Papers.)

Between 1939 and 1941, the government also appropriated more funds for the construction of roads and highways, notably the so-called Sayre highway,[ix] between Misamis and Bukidnon. The road construction effort bore immediate fruits that supported the grandiose resettlement project. Just as soon as a road was established, Filipino settlers

went in to clear the land for themselves even without the necessity of government assistance. Logged-over areas left by lumber companies also offered opportunities for making new *kaingin* (clearings) for the landless adventurers. Thousands of voluntary Filipino settlers came this way and occupied the landscape of what was once a frontier in the southern Philippines.

Also, by 1940 the Filipino-controlled legislature passed the Immigration Act that allowed an annual quota of 500 immigrants from all nations, except the U.S. Japan was visibly irked by this measure considering that at least 2,000 Japanese immigrants had annually entered the Philippines before. The Japanese Consul General in Manila naturally protested against this action, as others called it anti-Japanese. Apparently, this immigration law would add more teeth to the settlement project engineered for Filipinos in Mindanao as it simultaneously imposed limits to the entry of Japanese settlers to Davao.

Conclusion

There is every reason to believe that Japanese presence, or its morph ("Japanese menace"), is a major source of inspiration for many Filipino leaders to incorporate the frontier into the Philippine political map as quickly as possible. It propped up the government strategy to open the frontier for settlement as an effective way to handle the expanding Japanese colony in Davao and at the same time contain the "Moro problem" in the region. No doubt, *Dabao-kuo* aroused the nationalistic fervor as an answer to nation-building.

In a way, both the "Japanese menace" and the "Moro problem" served to ignite the national clamor to consolidate Philippine territory, perfecting the "three stars" symbolic of Filipino nationhood and identity. The Davao issue became moot and cooled off after independence in 1946, yet its memory lived on. It is a reminder of how the frontier was finally won. But new issues would sully forth, in part due to a revitalized Moro problem that now wages the battlecry for self-determination or secession. This is not our concern in the present paper.

What happened to *Dabao-kuo* after the World War II? It literally disappeared from public view, because of the backlash of the war itself. All the Japanese settlers had repatriated to Japan, but their countless descendants were left to the care of their Filipino mothers. Called *Nikkei-jins*, these descendants of Japanese ancestry suffer from persecution, prejudice and discriminatory practices so much that their identity as *mestizo hapon* (part-Japanese) was consciously obliterated. Many among them even denied such an identity to avoid exposure to all sorts of negative treatment. Scholars call this phenomenon "ethnocide" or the erasure of an ethnic group. But the "dead" ethnic would soon spring back to life, as if to say "hey, we are very much around!"

Today, a new beginning has entered the globalized era. Filipinos have forgotten the sad memories of the war, while descendants of *Dabao-kuo* have wanted to seek their rightful place in society. Japan has also begun to recognize its "other part" left to fend for itself in the global community. In 1990, it passed an Act known as the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition (ICRC) that allowed *Nikkei-jins* all over the world to enter Japan under a special permanent status (Kondo, 2002). Such had an enormous effect on Filipino *Nikkei-jins*. From 387 in 1992, the number increased to 1,024 a year later, then to 5,467 in 2000. The new immigrants to Japan, however, may realize that that they are in for a long haul (see Tsuda, 1998).

More *Nikkei-jins* are now seeking such a status. In Davao alone, about 5,000 have been registered under one of the three categories (A, B and C) and are hopeful that someday they will be recognized by Japan and given permanent residency visa.[x] On a larger plane, the longing for a "homeland" that only exists in people's imagery is revived. It promises to change the landscape of both Mindanao and the nature of Japanese diaspora. There is evidence to this claim. The Davao region is the largest source of Mindanao migrants to Japan as guestworkers and permanent residents.[xi] In the end, what awaits the *Dabao-kuo* residents in the lost homeland is still a narrative to be told or written.

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Notes

[i] "Brief Historical Overview of Japanese Emigration, 1868-1998," On the web http://www.jnrp.org/jnrp/english/overview.htm. (Accessed 5/10/2007).

[ii] According to F. Ohmori (in his letter to Gen. Burnett, Nov. 7, 1938, BIA 26712/18, henceforth *Ohmori Letter*), the Japanese paid between 50 and 70% of the taxes totaling P821,300 in 1937-38, with sales tax accounting for 300,000 and customs tax P371,300.

[iii] This trend continued somewhat until 1934, when 80 percent of the abaca production in Davao was accounted for by the Japanese, with an annual production of 500,000 bales of hemp (BIA 28876, Jan. 1, 1935).

[iv] Hearings before the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs, United States Senate, 72nd Congress, 1st Session on S. 3377 (Hawes-Cutting Bill), otherwise known as "A bill to enable the people of the Philippine Islands to provide for the independence of the same and for other purposes," together with Hearings before the Committee on Insular Affairs House of Representatives on HR 7233 "(A bill to provide for the independence of the Philippine Islands"), February 11 and 13, 1932. Washington: US Government Printing Office.

[v] Blanco was an American-educated Filipino from Columbia University and University of Pennsylvania, who advocated a Dominion status for the Philippines. Under this setup, it would enjoy continuing protection under the United States.

[vi] This was referred to as "Filipino dummies"for Japanese planters in subsequent investigation of the land issue in Davao headed by Secretary of Agriculture Eulogio Rodriguez. They were the ones who applied for government leases, or made it appear that

they owned the land, and then allowed the Japanese to cultivate the land for a fee (names of such dummies are documented in Hayase, 1984:Appendix 5). Horn (1941:267) said they acted as "front men" to the Japanese capitalists who they did all the work, the Filipinos being paid from 10-15% of the profit.

[vii] In particular, Quezon proposed the construction of a 130-kilometer railway between Davao and Cagayan de Misamis, and harness the Maria Cristina Falls for generating electricity. The first project did not materialize, but road construction proceeded nonetheless from 1936 to 1940.

[viii] Between 1932 and 1937, available data indicated that the government resettled 18,612 Christian families (including their members) for homesteading in Mindanao (see First, Second and Third "Annual Report of the President of the Philippines to the President and the Congress of the United States," for the years 1936, 1937 and 1938, in BIA 2074-520 - 527 and BIA 518A). At this time, three major sites were developed for the agricultural colonies: the Compostela-Monkayo region in Davao, the Kidapawan valley, and the Koronadal valley, both located in adjacent Cotabato.

[ix] Francis Sayre was the American High Commissioner (replacing the title Governor-General) of the Philippines at that time.

[x] The categories are: A (Nikkei-jin with koseki in Japan, B (1st generation koseki found but no 2nd generation koseki), and C (Nikkei-jinbut koseki of the 1st and 2nd generation not found), 7th *National Convention of the Federation of Nikkei-Jin Kai (Phils.) Inc.*, April 26-27, 2003, Bacolod City.

[xi] According to the National Statistical Coordination Board, in 2005 Region XI (comprising the Davao region) accounted for 10,000 OFWs to Japan out of a total of 15,000 for the whole of Mindanao (http://www.nscb.gov.ph/RU11/PRODUCTS/factsheet/factsheet.htm - FSm04-ru11-2005).